Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) are governed by two boards: the Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari'a Supervisory Board (SSB). The SSB is a panel of Shari'a scholars who act independently from other governance organs. This paper discriminates between dependent SSBs and independent SSBs by using twenty one variables, which are classified into three groups: the implementation of governance best practices, the recruitment of SSB members, and the relationship between the SSB members and other governance organs. This study is one of the first studies that provide empirical results about the SSB independence. Nevertheless, the research focuses exclusively on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and excludes the other countries where Shari'a supervision might have different forms. The study has developed a hypothesis, which was tested by a questionnaire. Data was collected from 76 Shari'a Supervisory Boards, 73 Boards of Directors, and 59 shareholders of IFIs in the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) during 2009. The discriminant analysis has been used in identifying both dependent and independent SSBs. The paper finds five variables relevant in discriminating the two groups. These variables are the incentives provided to the SSB; the average remuneration to the SSB members; the existence of the policy of penalties for violating the code of conduct; the relation between the SSB members and the BoD; and the role of executive management in recruiting SSB members.
Introduction
Board independence is an important element in corporate governance literature (Bhagat and Black, 2002) . Appointing outside directors in the Board of Directors (BoD) reduces the agency problem and increases earnings quality (Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000) . Moreover, the outside directors, due to their presumed independence, monitor and control the management more effectively (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990) , facilitate firms" borrowing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994) , and increase information acquisition (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998) . Peng (2004) defined the outside director as "Non-management directors who have family and/or professional relationships with the firm or firm management and non-management directors with no such relationships". Previous studies have examined the relation between the board composition and firm performance and presented contradicted results. Some studies (Ding and Wermers 2005; Peng, 2004) argued that outsider directors make a difference to firm performance. Other research (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) found that board independence is not associated with better performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1996) found a positive relation between the number of outside directors and the stock price. Gupta and Field (2009) argued that a relationship exists between the resignation of outside directors and the negative reaction of investors. However, the research on Board independence has not covered the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region (Barca and Becht, 2001 ; Claessens and Fan, 2003 ; La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Monks and Minow, 2004) .
Methodology
The hypothesis has been tested by a questionnaire, which was mailed to 219 IFIs in the GCC countries (appendix 1). The data was collected during June 2009. The alpha for the independence model is 0.869, which exceeds the standard measure of 0.70 (Cronbach, 1951; Nunnaly, 1978) . The questionnaire was also examined against different types of validity (Sekaran, 2003) . The questionnaire tested the impact of twenty one independent variables on discriminating dependent SSBs from independent SSBs.
The elements of the population are divided into three mutually exclusive groups: the shareholders, the BoD, and the SSB members. Stratified random sampling was used (Sekaran, 2003; Thompson, 2002) , where the average response rate from each group in the five countries collectively exceeded the standard rate 20% (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) as per Table 1 except in two groups of Saudi Arabia (BoD and shareholders), and in one group in the UAE (shareholders). Table 1 indicates the details of the response rate for each group. 
Descriptive Statistics
The SSB independence was measured by discriminant analysis. The questions used for discriminating the SSBs between dependent and independent boards were classified into three groups: questions with scaling answers, dichotomous questions, and multiple choice questions.
Scaling Questions
The first scaling question asked "How important is the role of the following parties in recruiting SSB members?" The third scaling question asked "Which of the following parties sets the terms of the SSB contract?" which was addressed to the BoD. Table 4 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The answer is made on a scaling level from 0 to 2 where 0 means no contract, 1 the terms of the contract are set by the shareholders, and 2 the terms of the contract are set by the BoD and/or executive management. The CONTRT variable has a mean of 1.1918 and a SD of 0.93775. 
Dichotomous Questions
The first dichotomous question asked "Do the SSB members own a percentage of the IFI's common stock?" Table 5 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The question was asked to the shareholders. Replies indicated that 14.5% of the SSB members had ownership, while 63.2% had no ownership. The missing answers were 22.40%. Table 6 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. This question was addressed to the BoD. 46.1% of the respondents declared the existence of the governance committee while 48.7% declined it. The missing answers were 5.3% only. Note: GOVCOM = Governance Committee
The third dichotomous question asked "Do you have a policy for related party transactions that addresses the conflicts of interest?" Table 7 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. This question was addressed to the BoD. 67.1% of the respondents confirmed the existence of the policy, while 28.9% revealed its absence. Only 3.9% of the respondents did not answer the question. Note: RLTPRT = Policy for Related Party Transactions
The fourth dichotomous question asked "Do you have an effective code of conduct reviewed by the SSB?" Table 8 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. This question was posed to the BoD. 55.3% of the respondents indicated the existence of the code, while 39.5% declared its absence. The missing answers were 5.3% only. The fifth dichotomous asked "Do you have a policy of penalties for any violation to the code of conduct?" Table 9 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. This question was addressed to the BoD. 59.2% of respondents confirmed the existence of the policy of penalties, and 35.5% revealed its absence. The missing answers were 5.3%. Note: POLPEN = Policy of Penalties
Multiple Choice Questions
The first multiple choice question asked "What is the relation between the SSB and the other governance organs in the organization chart?". Table 10 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The question was addressed to the SSB members. 53.9% of the respondents indicated that the SSB was placed under the shareholders but higher than the BoD, while 36.8% confirmed that the SSB and the BoD are placed at the same level, under the shareholders. Note: (SSB > BoD) = SSB is located higher than the BoD in the organization chart; (SSB = BoD) = both SSB and BoD are located at the same level; (BoD > SSB > CEO) = SSB is located lower than the BoD but higher than the CEO; (SSB < CEO) = SSB is located lower than the CEO.
This position is illustrated in Figure 1 . Examples of IFIs that have this type of structure include Al Baraka Islamic Bank in Bahrain and Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia. A very small number (3.9%) confirmed that the SSB is located under the BoD but higher than the executive management. This position in the hierarchy can affect SSB independence due to BoD restrictions being imposed. An example of an IFI that has this type of structure is the Arab Banking Corporation -Islamic Bank in Bahrain. This relation is presented in Figure 2 . In addition, 2.6% of the respondents confirmed that the SSB and the executive management are located at the same level, under the BoD. This position also might impair the SSB independence due to the management influence on the SSB. Examples of IFI"s that have this type of structure are Al Khaleej Development Company "Tameer" and Sakana Holistic Housing in Bahrain. This relation is illustrated in Figure 3 . Finally, about 2.6% of the respondents mentioned another location. The second multiple choice question asked "How many votes are required for the election of a new SSB member?" which was posed to the shareholders. Table 11 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. About 2.6% of the respondents indicated the total agreement of all the shareholders is required for electing new members; while 53.9% required more than 50% of the voting rights to appoint new members. About 21.1% were satisfied by collecting less than 50% of the voting rights. The missing answers were 22.4%. The third multiple choice question asked "What is the minority shareholders' influence on the SSB election process?" The question was addressed to the shareholders. Table 12 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. A very small number (3.9%) indicated a strong influence of minority shareholders on the election process while 1.3% indicated a significant influence. About 10.5% of the respondents indicated a normal influence of the minority shareholders and 15.8% indicated a slight influence for the minority shareholders. The majority of the respondents 46.1% confirmed that minority shareholders have no influence on the election process. The missing answers were 22.4%. The fourth multiple choice question asked "Is there any incentive provided to the SSB besides the remuneration?" Table 13 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The question was addressed to the shareholders, where 2.6% of the respondents indicated that SSB members receive common stock, while 1.3% receives a percentage of the annual profit. 5.3% indicated that SSB members receive an allowance for attending the meetings, and 3.9% stated that SSB members receive fringe benefits. The majority 64.5% reported that SSB members do not receive any incentive at all. There were 22.4% missing answers. The fifth multiple choice question asked "Which of the following positions is held by SSB members?" which was addressed to the BoD. Table 14 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. About 1.3% of the respondents declared that some of the SSB members are department managers, while 1.3% indicated that some of the SSB members are shareholders with significant ownership. The majority 93.4% confirmed that SSB members do not hold any position in the organization. On the other hand, all the respondents indicated that the SSB has no representative on the BoD or other committees or even counted among the main clients. The missing answers were 3.9%. The sixth multiple choice question asked "Is there any relation between the SSB member(s) and the Board member(s)?" Table 15 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The question was addressed to the BoD. The answers revealed the absence of influential relations between the two boards. However, 23.7% of the respondents declared the existence of non-influential relation, and 72.4% confirmed that no relation existed between the two boards. The missing answers represented 3.9%. The seventh multiple choice question asked "Is the average remuneration of SSB members higher / equal / lower than that of the BoD?" which was addressed to the BoD. The eighth multiple choice question asked "Is the performance of the SSB evaluated regularly?" which was addressed to the BoD. Table 17 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The results revealed that 60.5% of the SSBs are not evaluated, while 1.3% is evaluated by the shareholders. In 9.2% the SSB is evaluated by the BoD, and in 2.6% the SSB is evaluated by the audit committee. In addition, 22.4% of the SSBs are evaluated by the executive management. The missing answers were 3.9%. Table 18 includes the descriptive statistics of this question. The question was posed to the BoD. 10.5% of the answers indicated the replacement of 1% to 20% at the end of the contract period. 6.6% declared the replacement of 21% to 40%, while 2.6% indicated the replacement of 41% to 60%. A very small percentage 1.3% declared the replacement of 61% to 80%. The majority of the answers 72.4% confirmed the absence of replacement, while 2.6% had other answers. The missing answers were 3.9%. To summarize, the above questions are used for discriminating the SSBs between dependent and independent boards. The true values of the model are represented by (α) the intercept and (W 1 , W 2 , W 3 ,…..W 21 ) are the weights of the independent variables in discriminating dependence from independence. Each independent variable emphasizes one element in the SSB independence.
It is expected to find a significant contribution from these variables in discriminating the two groups: dependent SSBs and independent SSBs. The group statistics in Table 5 indicates the difference between the means of the groups for each item. For example, the mean for "POST1" in group 1 is 1.9091, while it is 1.5625 in group 2. Also, the mean for "ELCVOT" in group 1 is 2.1818, while it is 2.2500 in group 2 and so on. The difference in the two means for each variable indicates the ability of the variable to discriminate the two groups. Hence, the variables can be used in discrimination because each one has two different means. Table 6 indicates the result of Wilks" Lambda (multivariate test) and the model significance, which is an inverse measure of the discriminating data that is not already accountable by the function (Wilks, 1935) . Wilks" Lambda has a value of 0.375 which is neither perfect linear relationship nor complete independence, which indicates the robustness of the model. In addition, the overall model is highly significant (p < 0.01). Table 7 represents the eigenvalue which indicates the function appropriateness of the whole model. If eigenvalue equals zero, the model will have no discriminatory power (Le Blanc and Rucks, 1996) . However, in our model, the eigenvalue is 1.666 which confirms its discriminatory power. Table 7 also includes the percentage of variance which will be meaningful in case of having several functions where they can be added to get the measure of total discriminating power 100%. Since the model includes one function, it has the whole percentage (100%); nevertheless, the large eigenvalue (1.666) indicates the powerful relation of the model. Levine, 1977) . The value of the canonical correlation usually varies between 0 and 1, where zero denotes no relationship and 1 indicates the maximum relation (Le Blanc and Rucks, 1996) . Hence, the model has a high canonical correlation (0.791), it indicates the excellent explanatory capability of the function. In other words, the model explains 89% of the variance ( ). Thus, the discriminant function can be determined by examining the percentage of variance and the canonical correlation together. Table 8 includes the structure matrix that lists the ranking order of each independent variable with the discriminant function. The variables are sorted out by their absolute sizes of correlation within the function. Accordingly, the first five variables in table 8 are the most important factors in discriminating the two groups. These variables are the incentives provided to the SSB (CENTIV); the average remuneration to the SSB members (REMUN); the existence of the policy of penalties for violating the code of conduct (POLPEN); the relation between the SSB members and the BoD (RELAT); and the role of executive management in recruiting SSB members (RECEXC). The remaining variables are less important in discriminating the two groups. Table 9 reports the mean of each group in the discriminant function. Hence, if the score of one variable is closer to -2.651, then this variable probably represents the dependent group, but if it is closer to 0.607, then the data probably came from the independent group. Table 10 presents the information of the actual group membership versus predicted group membership. If the discrimination between the two groups is based on natural guess, we expect a 50% success rate. However, by using the discriminant function the variables were able to classify 93.2% of the SSBs correctly into dependent and independent. The sensitivity rate of the dependent group is 90.9% and the specificity of the second group is 93.8%.
According to the results of Table 10 , the Positive Probability Value (PPV) and the Negative Probability Value (NPV) can be computed as follows: PPV = 10 / (10+3+17) = 30% NPV = 45 / (45 + 1) = 97.8%
The PPV refers to the SSBs that were predicted to be independent but they were dependent, while NPV refers to the SSBs that were predicted to be dependent but they were independent (Pepe, 2003; Riegelman, 2000) . Hence, the apparent classification error is about 6.8% which is acceptable within experimental error in social science analysis. Therefore, the results confirm the hypothesis which predicts that:
The segments of the SSB dependence and independence are reasonably distinct.
Conclusion
The research identifies five variables relevant in discriminating the two groups. These variables are the incentives provided to the SSB; the average remuneration to the SSB members; the existence of the policy of penalties for violating the code of conduct; the relation between the SSB members and the BoD; and the role of executive management in recruiting SSB members. The executive management has the highest impact on the recruitment of the SSB members, while the minority shareholders have the least influence on the SSB 
